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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRAL AWARDS BY
NATIONAL COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND INDIA
By
APARNA DEVI JUJJAVARAPU
(Under the Direction of Professor Gabriel M. Wilner)
ABSTRACT
Article V of the New York convention lays down the provisions under which the recognition
and enforcement of an arbitral award may be refused. The United States and India are signatories
to the Convention. Section 10(a) of the Federal Arbitration Act in the United States limits the
scope of judicial review of the arbitral awards to a clear list of grounds of vacatur. The national
courts of the United States have recognized several non-statutory grounds of which "manifest
disregard of the law" as a standard of review is the focus in this thesis. In fact, the state of
Georgia has also adopted this ground into its statute in 2003. Section 34 of the Indian Arbitration
and Conciliation Act of 1996 lays down the provisions for setting aside arbitral awards of which
the ground of ‘public policy’ has been interpreted by the Supreme Court of India broadening its
scope to include ‘patent illegality’ which essentially meant “error of law” as a new ground for
setting aside an arbitral award. Scope of judicial review by national courts, both in the United
States and in India, should be limited to the statutory provisions so as to not frustrate the purpose
of arbitration.
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CHAPTER I - International Commercial Arbitration - General Provisions for
recognition and enforcement of Arbitral Awards

“By and large, parties to international transactions choose to arbitrate eventual disputes
not because arbitration is simpler than litigation, not because it is cheaper, not because arbitrators
may have greater relevant expertise than national judges, although any one of those factors
maybe of interest; they arbitrate simply because neither will suffer its rights and obligations to be
determined by the courts of the other party’s state of nationality.”1
Introduction
With the explosive globalization of trade and investment, there has been a corresponding
increase in commercial disputes between parties across national boundaries.2 International
arbitration is being increasingly sought after as the best mode of alternative dispute resolution in
such commercial disputes.
Arbitration offers a number of advantages over litigation. In fact, even if an agreement to
arbitrate does not already exist when a dispute arises, the parties may still agree to submit the
dispute to arbitration for resolution and take advantage of the benefits that arbitration affords.3
This thesis focuses upon the judicial review of international commercial arbitral awards by
national courts both in the United States and India in terms of their recognition and enforcement,

1

INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY: TOWARDS “JUDICIALIZATION” AND UNIFORMITY?
Introduction at x [Twelfth Sokol Colloquium] (R.Lilich & C.Brower eds., 1993).
2
Earl McLaren, Effective use of International Commercial Arbitration: A Primer for In-house Counsel, 19 J. INT’L
ARB. 473, 473 (2002).
3
Id. at 474.

2
where the courts have gone beyond the statutory scope of review and have attempted to either
review or set aside arbitral awards on non-statutory standards such as the “manifest disregard of
the law” in the United States or “error of law” in India. In this thesis, an attempt has been made
to analyze the judicial decisions by various national courts in the United States and India
(updated until September 2007) so as to highlight the latest trend in judicial review of arbitral
awards. The scope of the ‘public policy’ defense employed in the United States for setting aside
arbitral awards has been first discussed, following which the general trend of the national courts
going beyond the scope of the statutory grounds in reviewing arbitral awards under the “manifest
disregard of law” is discussed in detail. The state of Georgia in the Unites States has, in fact,
adopted this standard of review in its statute in 2003 which has paved the way for courts in
Georgia to freely interpret the arbitral awards and for parties to seek review under the statute
itself. This thesis then proceeds to explain the scope of ‘public policy’ laid down in India by its
Supreme Court initially and the Court’s subsequent review of the ‘public policy’ defense in
2003, broadening it to include ‘patent illegality’, which essentially meant ‘error of law’ as a
standard for setting aside arbitral awards. The thesis concludes with a few observations on this
trend of review by national courts both in the United States and in India while setting out that in
order to preserve the scope and purpose of arbitration, it is desirable that the national courts
desist from broadening the scope of judicial review beyond the statutory principles set out in the
arbitration laws of the respective countries.

3
A.

Advantages of International Arbitration
Arbitration can be a superior or an inferior alternative to litigation, depending on the

circumstances of the case. Some of the advantages most often associated with international
arbitration are:4
1) Flexible process;
2) Neutral forum;
3) Confidentiality;
4) Specialized Tribunal;
5) Finality and Enforcement; and
6) Cost.
Though all of the above advantages are self-explanatory, “Finality and Enforcement” is perhaps
most relevant and is discussed in detail with reference to the recognition and enforcement of
arbitral awards.

B.

Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards
The recognition and enforcement of an award has always been understood to be separate

from the making of the award itself, the reason being, the award is given by an arbitrator whose
authority is based on the contract between the parties and who does not possess the authority of
the State.5 Further, the international treaties that govern the enforcement of an arbitral award,
such as the New York Convention,6 have much greater acceptance internationally than treaties

4

Id.
V.S Deshpande, Enforcement of Foreign Awards in India, U.K and U.S.A, 4 J. INT’L ARB., 41, 53 (1987).
6
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, art. V, 7 June 1959,21 U.S.T. 2517,
330 U.N.T.S. 38, (effective in the United States on December 29,1970) (hereinafter “the New York Convention”).
5

4
for the reciprocal enforcement of court judgments.7 Indeed, the United States, which is a party to
the New York Convention, “is not a party to a single treaty providing for enforcement of foreign
judgments.”8 Article V of the New York Convention lays down the provisions under which the
recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may be refused under the Convention, which
are set out hereunder.

C.

New York Convention - Article V
1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of the party
against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent authority, where
the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that:
(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, under the law applicable to
them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under the law to which
the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the
country where the award was made; or
(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the
appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to
present his case; or
(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms
of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of
the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to
arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, that part of the award which
contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be recognized and enforced; or

7
8

McLaren, supra note 2, at 475.
Id.

5
(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in
accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in
accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place; or
(e) The award has not yet become binding, on the parties, or has been set aside or
suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which,
that award was made.
2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the competent
authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that:
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under
the law of that country; or
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of
that country.9

9

Art V of The New York Convention.

6

CHAPTER II - Review of Arbitral Awards in the United States - Statutory Provisions

Commercial arbitration in the United States has continued to evolve and has continued to
gain importance as compared to litigation. As the evolution unfolds, several important questions
have emerged, the answers to which will do much to shape the nature, character, and viability of
commercial arbitration in the future.10 The most important among these questions is the proper
standards for judicial review of commercial arbitration awards.

A.

Scope of ‘Public Policy” defense under Article V 2(b) of the New York Convention
Article V(1) contains a list of general defenses to enforcement of arbitral awards. Article

V(2) contains two additional defenses: the “inarbitrability” defense and “public policy” defense.
The approach of federal courts in the United States to the arguments made under Article V 2(b)
that foreign arbitration awards should not be enforced when they violate public policy could be
understood from the following four Supreme Court decisions, which involve international
commercial agreements containing forum selection clauses that provided for the resolution of
disputes in a forum outside the United States.11
The Supreme Court in 1972 in M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.12 upheld a forum
selection clause in an agreement between an American oil company and a German towing firm.

10

Stephen L.Hayford, Law in Disarray: Judicial Standards for Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration Awards,, 30 GA.
L.REV. 731, 734 (1996).
11
Andrew M. Campbell, Refusal to Enforce Foreign Arbitration Awards on Public Policy Grounds, 144 A.L.R FED.
481 (1998).
12
407 U.S. 1 (1972)

7
Two years later in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,13 the Court again upheld a forum selection
clause providing for arbitration of disputes. Subsequently, the Supreme Court in Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,14

held that a provision in an agreement

providing for the arbitration before arbitrators in Japan of disputes arising out of an automobile
dealership agreement was enforceable, even though it covered anti-trust claims under United
States laws. The Court concluded that the concerns of international comity, respect for the
capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals and sensitivity to the need of the international
commercial system for predictability in the resolution of disputes required that it enforces the
parties' agreement, even assuming that a contrary result would be forthcoming in a domestic
context because of the traditional view that anti-trust claims are not subject to arbitration.15
However, the dissent by Justice Stevens in this case was very strong. He stated that, “vague
concerns over comity were not to outweigh public policy.”16 He distinguished the Mitsubishi
Motors case from Scherk as the facts in Mitsubishi Motors did not involve foreign laws and were
totally under the realm of U.S. antitrust laws.17 He pointed out that Congress did not authorize
the transfer of decision-making authority of statutory claims from courts to the arbitrators, 18 and
noted that under the New York Convention, “agreements requiring arbitration of disputes that
were non-arbitrable under domestic law were not to be honored”.19 The Mitsubishi Motors case
is a clear example of how the Supreme Court sacrificed public policy in the name of international
comity. Finally, the Supreme Court in Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer,20 in
an arbitration regarding a bill of lading, stated that any dispute arbitrated in Japan under Japanese
13

417 U.S. 506 (1974)
105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985).
15
Id.
16
Id. at 3365 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
17
Id. at 3373.
18
Id. at 3364.
19
Id. at 3371.
20
515 U.S. 528 (1995)
14
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law was enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act21 notwithstanding the argument that it
reduced the liabilities of the carrier in violation of the Carriage of Goods by Seas Act because it
would be more difficult for the owner of the cargo to sue the shipper in Japan than it would be
elsewhere. The federal courts have echoed the Supreme Court's emphasis on the importance of
avoiding a parochial viewpoint in their enforcement of foreign arbitral awards by enforcing them
despite claims that the arbitration procedures violated United States public policy in various
ways.22
Currently, U.S. law does not require commercial arbitrators to set forth their reasons for their
decision in a written award.23 Earlier, federal courts had continuously held that absence of
express reasoning by the arbitrators does not warrant vacatur of the arbitral award.24
Nevertheless, in recent years, particularly since the mid-1980s, there is evidence of an increasing
willingness by the federal courts to look behind commercial arbitration awards in an effort to
ascertain whether the arbitral reasoning which lead to that result is so flawed by grave errors of
law, fact, or contract interpretation as to warrant its vacatur by a reviewing court.25

B.

Federal Arbitration Act of the United States – Section 10(a)
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) was passed by the Congress in 192526 in the wake of

agitation and pressure from the business-led reform movement against the costliness and delay of

21

United States Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307
(2000).
22
See Campbell, supra note 11.
23
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198, 204 n.4 (1956) [(“(A]rbitrators need not disclose the facts
or reasons behind their award”).
24
French v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 784 F.2d 902, 907-08 (9th Cir. 1986).
25
See Hayford, supra note 10 at 735.
26
United States Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307
(2000).
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litigation.27 While enacting the FAA, Congress recognized the need for finality of arbitration
awards and therefore limited the scope of judicial review of arbitral awards to a clear list of
grounds of vacatur.28 Section 10(a) of the FAA sets out the following grounds upon which a
commercial arbitration award may be vacated:
In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the district wherein the
award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the application of any party
to the arbitration(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them.
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing,
upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the
controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been
prejudiced.
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a
mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
(5) If an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement required the award to
be made has not expired, the court may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing by the
arbitrators.29

27

Brent S. Gilfedder, “A Manifest disregard of Arbitration?” An analysis of recent Georgia legislation adding
“manifest disregard of the law” to the Georgia Arbitration Code as a statutory ground for vacatur, 39 GA. L REV.
259, 269 (2004).
28
Id.
29
9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2000).
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C.

Uniform Arbitration Act - Section 23(a)
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws promulgated the

Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA) in 1955.30 By far the UAA has been one the most successful
uniform laws to date as over thirty-five states have adopted it in its entirety and fourteen more
use it as a model for their state arbitration acts.31 The UAA was designed for the same reasons as
the FAA--to ensure the enforceability and finality of arbitration agreements and to overcome
state judicial hostility32—and, in fact, the drafters of the UAA used the FAA as a model.33 The
drafters revised the Uniform Arbitration Act in 200034 in order to deal with the increased use of
arbitration, greater complexities of underlying arbitration disputes, and intervening changes in
arbitration law.35 The statutory grounds for vacatur under the revised UAA are found in Section
23.36 Section 23(a) provides:
Upon [motion] to the court by a party to an arbitration proceeding, the court shall vacate
an award made in the arbitration proceeding if:
(1) the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means;

30

See Gilfedder, supra note 27, at 269.

31

See generally Stephen J. Ware, "Opt-in" for Judicial Review of Errors of Law under the Revised Uniform
Arbitration Act, 8 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 263 (1999) (noting Uniform Arbitration Act is one of most successful
uniform laws ever and discussing changes made in Revised Uniform Arbitration Act).
32
Id.
33
Timothy J. Heinsz, The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act: Modernizing, Revising, and Clarifying Arbitration Law,
J. DISP. RESOL. 1 (2001).
34
See Unif. Arbitration Act §§ 1-23 (amended 2000), 7 U.L.A. 6 (Supp. 2004).
35

See Heinsz, supra note 33, at 2. The Drafting Committee sought to accomplish three main goals through the
Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (RUAA): 1. Because arbitration is at heart a consensual process, the RUAA gives
party autonomy primary consideration . . . . 2. Many parties choose arbitration because of its relative speed, lower
cost, and greater efficiency. The RUAA intends to give these factors sufficient weight whenever possible. 3. In most
cases, parties intend the arbitrators' decisions to be final with little or no court involvement unless there is clear
unfairness or denial of justice. The RUAA recognizes this contractual nature of arbitration by limiting the grounds
on which a court may review an arbitrator's award. Id.; see also Unif. Arbitration Act Prefatory Note (amended
2000), 7 U.L.A. 2 (Supp. 2004) (stating similar goals for revisions to UAA).
36
Unif. Arbitration Act § 23(a) (amended 2000), 7 U.L.A. 46 (Supp. 2004).
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(2) there was: (A) evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral arbitrator; (B)
corruption by an arbitrator; or (C) misconduct by an arbitrator prejudicing the rights of a
party to the arbitration proceeding;
(3) an arbitrator refused to postpone the hearing upon showing of sufficient cause for
postponement, refused to consider evidence material to the controversy, or otherwise
conducted the hearing contrary to Section 15, so as to prejudice substantially the rights of
a party to the arbitration proceeding;
(4) an arbitrator exceeded the arbitrator's powers;
(5) there was no agreement to arbitrate, unless the person participated in the arbitration
proceeding without raising an objection under Section 15(c) not later than the beginning
of the arbitration hearing; or
(6) the arbitration was conducted without proper notice of the initiation of an arbitration
proceeding as required in Section 9 so as to prejudice substantially the rights of a party to
the arbitration proceeding. 37
In essence the revised UAA focused towards preserving the integrity of the arbitration
process by refusing vacatur merely because the "relief [granted by arbitration is] such that
it could not or would not be granted by a court of law or equity."38

37

Id.
See Unif. Arbitration Act, § 12(a), 7 U.L.A. 280-81 (1997); see also Amy J. Schmitz, Ending a Mud Bowl:
Defining Arbitration's Finality Through Functional Analysis, 37 GA. L. REV. 123, 155-56 (2002) (recognizing
foregone vacatur options where arbitrator acts on principles of fairness and equity in balancing parties' rights). An
arbitrator's treatment of substantive law principles is untouched by the UAA just as it is in the FAA. See Murray S.
Levin, The Role of Substantive Law in Business Arbitration and the Importance of Volition, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 105,
108 (1997) (reiterating shallow pool for vacatur justification). The UAA implicitly denies recognition to "error of
law" claims, even those that are egregious. Id. at 110.
38
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When the drafting committee in 1997 assembled to review the UAA and current trends in
state arbitration, a heated debate surrounded a new proposal that would have provided for
vacatur if the parties "opted in" for review based on errors of law where a decision substantially
prejudiced one party.39 A similar conflict arose over the common-law application of the
"manifest disregard of the law" standard employed by certain courts as a non-statutory basis to
review arbitral awards.40 Neither proposed provision gained inclusion into the Revised Uniform
Arbitration Act (RUAA), leaving arbitration "a desirable alternative to litigation ... [without
making] arbitration simply another form of litigation."41
Since the scope of this thesis is the “manifest disregard of the law” under the “non-statutory”
standards of vacatur of arbitral awards in the United States, analysis under the above statutory
provisions both under the FAA and RUAA are not discussed here.

39
40

41

See Heinsz, supra note 33, at 27 (recognizing failure to revise UAA to include "opt in" error of law reviewability).
Id. at 30 (mentioning past circuit and state court use of “manifest disregard of the law” non-statutory ground).

See RUAA Drafting Committee, Policy Statement: Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (RUAA) (May 15, 2000),
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/uarba/arbps0500.htm (expressing committee's desire to keep arbitration process
efficient, expeditious, economical, fair, and final). The drafters determined that a new "manifest disregard" standard could
overload the trial courts with arbitration award appeals and that no bright-line test for vacatur existed. Heinsz, supra note
33, at 34-35 (highlighting lack of clear standard for applying "manifest disregard of the law"). The RUAA does not
prohibit challenges to arbitrator authority on these grounds; common law dictates if and when these non-statutory
grounds may be used.
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CHAPTER III - Review of Arbitral awards in the United States – Non-Statutory
Provisions

In addition to the four statutory grounds articulated in section 10(a) of the FAA,42 several
federal circuit courts of appeals have recognized one or more "non-statutory" grounds warranting
vacatur of an otherwise valid commercial arbitration award. Primary among those non-statutory
grounds is a "manifest disregard" of the law by the arbitrator, a conflict between the award and a
clear and well established "public policy," an award that is "arbitrary and capricious"

or

"completely irrational," and a failure of the award to "draw its essence" from the parties'
contract.43
Only the Fourth Circuit has unequivocally rejected the non-statutory grounds for vacatur. In
Remmey v. PaineWebber, Inc.,44 the Fourth Circuit stated:
Courts are not free to overturn an arbitral result because they would have reached a
different conclusion if presented with the same facts. In the Federal Arbitration Act,
Congress has limited the grounds upon which an arbitral award can be vacated, namely,
a court may vacate an award [on the basis of the four grounds set forth in section 10(a)].
The statutory grounds for vacatur permit challenges on sufficiently improper conduct in

42

9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000).
See Hayford supra note 10 at 739.
44
32 F. 3d 143 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied115 S. Ct. 903 (1995).
43
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the course of the proceedings; they do not permit rejection of an arbitral award based on
disagreement with the particular result the arbitrators reached.45
The Fourth Circuit case law has thus far followed the clear rule set down in Remmey.
Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit falls to place in the "statutory-grounds-only" category.46
It is clear that most of the federal circuit courts do not limit their scope of review of
commercial arbitration awards to a strict reading of section 10(a) of the FAA.47 These courts
believe that they "retain a very limited power to review commercial arbitration awards outside of
Section 10"48 under several judicially created, non-statutory grounds for vacatur. The manner in
which this judicially created power of review has been exercised by the several circuit courts that
do not limit themselves to the section 10(a) statutory grounds for vacatur is the subject of
discussion below.

A.

“Manifest disregard of the Law” as a standard for reviewing arbitral awards
Despite the facial clarity of Section 10(a), all twelve U.S Circuit Courts of Appeals (save the

Federal Circuit) have embraced one or more non-statutory grounds of vacatur.49 Seminal among
the non-statutory grounds for vacatur is the “manifest disregard” of the law standard, which was
derived from the dictum in the United States Supreme Court's 1953 opinion in Wilko v. Swan.50
Although Section 10 of the FAA51 does not contain the words, “manifest disregard of the law,”
courts have found that if an award is found to be in manifest disregard of the law, it can be
45

32 F. 3d 143, 146 (4th Cir. 1994).
See Hayford supra note10, at 764.
47
See Bowles Fin. Group, Inc. v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 22 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1994) ("'Federal courts have never
limited their scope of review [of an arbitration award] to a strict reading of 9 U.S.C. § 10’]” (alterations in original)
(quoting Jenkins v. Prudential Bache Sec., Inc., 847 F.2d 631, 633 (10th Cir. 1988)).
48
Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F. 2d. 6, 8 (1st Cir. 1990).
49
Stephen L.Hayford, Reining in the “Manifest Disregard” of the Law Standard: The Key to Restoring Order to
The Law Of Vacatur, J.DISP. RESOL. 117, 118 (1998).
50
346 U.S. 427 (1953).
51
9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000).
46
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vacated on judicial review.52 The First Circuit observed that, ‘Where a reviewing court is
inclined to find that arbitrators’ reasoning, if given, would have strained credulity, the absence of
explanation may reinforce the reviewing court’s confidence that the arbitrators engaged in
manifest disregard.53
Thus, courts have vacated awards that show a “manifest disregard of the law,” directly
conflict with “public policy”, are arbitrary and capricious.54 The federal circuit courts of appeals,
based on Supreme Court dicta, created the manifest disregard of the law standard.55 While this
standard has existed for many years, it has been applied infrequently.56 One reason for this
sporadic use is the difficulty in defining exactly what constitutes a manifest disregard of the law.
This difficulty is illustrated by the federal U.S. circuit courts of appeals, which have been unable
to fashion a uniform standard.57 This lack of a clear definition or a clear method of application
raises serious doubts as to how effective this standard can be in the judicial review of arbitration
awards58. In addition, what were the judiciary's original reasons for enacting these additional
grounds for vacatur and whether they contradict the fundamental goals of the arbitration process
are more questions that arise when considering expanded judicial review of arbitration awards.59
52

See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953); Management Recruiters Intern., Inc. v. Bloor, 129 F. 3d 851 (6th Cir.
1997) (stating that manifest disregard for the law, in contrast to misinterpretation, misstatement, or misapplication of
law, can constitute grounds for vacating an arbitration decision).
53
PCS 2000 LP v. Romulus Telecommunications, Inc., 148 F. 3d 32 (1st Cir. 1998)
54
See Stephen L. Hayford & Scott B. Kerrigan, Vacatur: The Non-Statutory Grounds for Judicial Review of
Commercial Arbitration Awards, 51 OCT. DISP. RESOL. J. 22, 26-27 (1996) (discussing different nonstatutory
grounds for vacatur that federal courts have fashioned).
55
Id. at 26.
56
See Hayford, supra note 54 at 29. (noting that as of 1998, there were only two cases where Federal Circuit Courts
of Appeals had vacated commercial arbitration awards for manifest disregard of law).
57
See e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1986) (stating that
manifest disregard of law clearly means more than arbitral error or misunderstanding with respect to law); Halligan
v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 204 (2d Cir. 1998) (applying manifest disregard of law standard when error is
clearly discernible from record); Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 128 F.3d 1456, 1461-62 (11th Cir. 1997)
(recognizing manifest disregard standard for first time in Eleventh Circuit and concluding "that a manifest disregard
for the law, in contrast to a misinterpretation, misstatement or misapplication of the law, can constitute grounds to
vacate an arbitration decision").
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See Gilfedder, supra note 27 at 261.
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B.

Origin of the “manifest disregard of law” as a standard of review
1. Wilko v. Swan
The manifest disregard of the law standard first originated in the United States Supreme

Court case of Wilko v. Swan.60This case involved a claim of fraud brought against a securities
brokerage firm pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933.61 The respondent moved for a stay of trial
pending the outcome of arbitration that the parties had agreed upon prior to entering into their
contractual relationship to deal in securities.62 The district court denied the stay, but the second
court of appeals reversed the judgment.63 The United States Supreme Court’s reasoning
displayed its traditional hostility toward arbitration.64
In dicta, the Court stated: While it may be true that a failure of the arbitrators to decide in
accordance with the provisions of the Securities Act would "constitute grounds for vacating the
award pursuant to section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act," that failure would need to be made
clearly to appear. In unrestricted submissions, such as the present margin agreements envisage,
the interpretations of the law by the arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject,
in the federal courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation.65 The Supreme Court held that
parties could not arbitrate issues relating to Securities law because of public policy concerns
underlying the Securities Act of 1933 and because of the underlying concern about the
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346 U.S 427 (1953).
Id. at 428
62
Id. at 429
63
Id. at 430
64
See Id. at 435-436. The court stated: This case requires subjective findings on the purpose and knowledge of an
alleged violator of the Act. They must be not only determined but applied by the arbitrators without judicial
instruction on the law. As their award may be made without explanation of their reasons and without a complete
record of their proceedings, the arbitrators' conception of the legal meaning of such statutory requirements as
"burden of proof," "reasonable care" or "material fact." . . . cannot be examined.; see also Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14 (1984).
61

65

346 U.S. at 436-37 (emphasis added) (quoting Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439, 445 (2d Cir. 1953)).
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inarbitrability of securities law issues.66 That the Supreme Court's opinion in Wilko v. Swan

67

has, even after over fifty years, left the federal circuit courts of appeals in a state of confusion
regarding the grounds on which a commercial arbitration award properly may be vacated is an
understatement.68
2. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express
In 1989, the Supreme Court reversed Wilko in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American
Express.69 The issue in Rodriguez as to “whether a pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate claims
arising under the Securities Act of 1933 is unenforceable, requiring resolution of the claims only
in a judicial forum"70 centered on the very same question decided by the Court in Wilko. Here,
the Supreme Court reverser it own precedent of some 36 years in this case by ignoring the rule of
Wilko that section 12(2) claims under the 1933 Act were not arbitrable.
The Supreme Court's rejection of Wilko and the "old judicial hostility to arbitration", which
pervaded its former characterization of the commercial arbitration process, was founded on what
the Court described as an "erosion" of generally held views over the years,71 as intensified by
the Court's holdings in Shearson/American Express v. McMahon,72 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,73 Dean Witter Reynolds v. Byrd,74 and Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.75 In particular, the Rodriguez Court focused on the
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Id. at 434-35
Id. at 436, overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
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Brad A. Galbraith, Note, Vacatur of Commercial Arbitral Awards in Federal Courts: Contemplating the Use and
Utility of the “Manifest Disregard” of the Law Standard”, 27 IND. L.REV. 241, 249 (1993). (discussing the extent
to which Wilko left lower courts in confusion about proper grounds for vacatur).
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490 U.S. 477 (1989).
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Id. at 478.
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Id. at 480-81.
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484 U.S. 220 (1987).
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473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).
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470 U.S. 213 (1985).
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460 U.S. 1 (1983).
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statement in Mitsubishi that "by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forego
the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits their resolution to an arbitral, rather
than a judicial forum." 76 The Court then stated emphatically: "to the extent that Wilko rested on
suspicion of arbitration as a method of weakening the protections afforded in the substantive law
to would-be complainants, it has fallen far out of step with our current strong endorsement of the
federal statutes favoring this method of resolving disputes."77
When it reversed Wilko in Rodriguez, the Court did not address the "manifest disregard" of
the law dictum.78 And in the 56 years since Wilko, the Supreme Court has never clarified the
meaning and effect it attributes to the "manifest disregard" of the law standard.79 Similarly, the
Court has never clarified the manner in which the "manifest disregard" construct relates, if at all,
to the statutory grounds for vacatur of commercial arbitration awards articulated in Section 10(a)
of the FAA.80 Because a majority of the Supreme Court has never spoken definitively to the
continued viability of the "manifest disregard" of the law standard in light of Rodriguez, the
question as to whether the Wilko dictum is still a proper basis for this and all of the other nonstatutory grounds for vacatur remains open.81 Nevertheless, the broad acceptance of the
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Rodriquez, 490 U.S. at 481(quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985)).
77
Id. at 481-82.
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The “manifest disregard” standard has been mentioned in Supreme Court opinions only three times since 1953,
always in dictum, always in passing, twice in dissent. In his dissent in Mitsubishi Motors, Justice Stevens noted,
without further comment, "arbitration awards are reviewable for manifest disregard of the law." Mitsubishi Motors,
473 U.S. at 656 (1985). (Stevens, J., dissenting). In his concurring in part opinion in Shearson/American Express v.
McMahon, 514 U.S. 938 (1995), Justice Blackmun observed: "judicial review is still substantially limited to the four
grounds listed in § 10 of the [Federal] Arbitration Act and to the concept of 'manifest disregard' of the law." 482
U.S. 220, 259 (1987). The third reference by the Court to the Wilko manifest disregard dictum is found in a
parenthetical phrase in the 1995 case, First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995).
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See Hayford, supra note 49, at 122.
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Id.
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Al-Harbi v. Citibank, N.A., 85 F.3d 680, 684 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("Although the holding in Wilko was overruled
by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., the dicta that constitutes the core of appellant's
argument [relying upon the ‘manifest disregard of the law’ ground for vacatur] was unaffected by the grounds of the
overruling.").
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"manifest disregard" of the law ground by the U.S. circuit courts of appeals demonstrates they do
not question its legitimacy and continued viability.82

C.

The Development of the “manifest disregard of the law” Standard
Most of the circuit courts of appeals have, in one way or other, reviewed arbitral awards

based on the ‘manifest disregard’ of the law standard. Selected cases of the various circuits,
showing the development of the “manifest disregard” standard, are discussed below:
First Circuit
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held in Advest v. McCarthy83 that manifest
disregard of the law entails a showing that the arbitrator "appreciated the existence of a
governing legal rule but willfully decided not to apply it."84
Later in Bull H N Information Systems, Inc.,85 the First Circuit confirmed an award, which
had been vacated by the District Court. With regard to the standards for setting aside awards, the
Court held: Beyond the specific grounds enumerated in Section 10, courts “retain a very limited
power to review arbitration awards”. Essentially, arbitration awards are subject to review “where
an award is contrary to the plain language of the [contract]” and “instances where it is clear from
the record that the arbitrator recognized the applicable law–and then ignored it”.86 In the parlance
of this and other circuits, a reviewing court may vacate an arbitration award if it was made in
“manifest disregard” of the law.87
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See Hayford, supra note 49 at 122.
914 F. 2d. 6 (1st Cir. 1990).
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Id. at 10.
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Bull HN Information Systems, Inc., v.Charles J. Hutson, 229 F.3d 321 (1st Cir. 2000).
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Id.
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Id. at 331 (quoting Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 1990)).
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Second Circuit
Initially the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was consistent with the other
circuits following Wilko and First Options in Merrill Lynch v. Bobker88 and Willemijn
Houdstermaatschappij, BV v. Standard Microsystems Corporation.89However, in Halligan v.
Piper Jaffray,90 when considering an appeal from a district court decision that confirmed an
award that denied relief to the petitioner, the court made an extensive review of the evidence at
the arbitration hearing. The opinion cited reference to a lower court’s statement that the record
“does not indicate the Panel’s awareness, prior to its determination, of the standards for burden
of proof.”91 The Second Circuit, without any other reference to disregard of a specific law, and
after observing that the Panel made no explanation of its award, concluded: At least in the
circumstances here, we believe that when a reviewing court is inclined to hold that an arbitration
panel manifestly disregarded the law, the failure of the arbitrators to explain the award can be
taken into account. Having done so, we are left with the firm belief that the arbitrators here
manifestly disregarded the law or the evidence or both.92 In this case, the Second Circuit
indicated for the first time that the consideration and weighing of the evidence by the Court
could be factors in determining whether an award should be rejected under the manifest
disregard standard.
Finally in Westerbeke Corp. v. Daihatsu Motor Co.,93 the Second Circuit set forth its own
two-prong test94 that an arbitrator first must be aware of the well-defined, explicit applicable law
and then must have ignored it completely.95
88

808 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1986).
103 F.3d (2d Cir. 1997)
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148 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 1998).
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Id.
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Id. at 204.
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Third Circuit
Although the issue concerned the interpretation of a contract, the Third Circuit in United
Transportation Union Local 1589 v. Suburban Transit Corporation96 recited the following rule:
“Only when an arbitrator ‘acted in manifest disregard of the law, or if the record before the
arbitrator reveals no support whatsoever for the arbitrator’s determination,” may a district court
invade the province of the arbitrator.”97
Fifth Circuit
Prior to the decision of First Options v. Kaplan,98 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit had declined to recognize the manifest disregard standard in FAA cases involving
commercial contract disputes between securities brokers and investors.99 An early Fifth Circuit
case stated in dictum that judicial review of a commercial arbitration award was limited to
section 10 and 11 of the FAA.100In fact, it was not until after Wilko and First Options decisions
that the Fifth Circuit recognized the manifest disregard standard in the 1999 case of Arthur
H.Williams v. Cigna Financial Advisors, Inc.101
In our opinion, clear approval of the “manifest disregard” of the law standard in review of
arbitration awards under the FAA was signaled by the Supreme Court’s statement in First
Options that “parties (are) bound by (an) arbitrator’s decisions not in manifest disregard
of the law.”. . . . Accordingly, each of the other numbered federal circuit courts and the
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Id. (citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F. 2d. 930, 934 (2nd Cir. 1986).).
51 F.3d 376 (1995).
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Id at 380.
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514 U.S. 938 (1995).
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See generally McIlroy v. PaineWebber, Inc., 989 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1993); R. M. Perez & Associates, Inc. v.
Welch, 960 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1992).
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DC circuit have recognized manifest disregard of the law as either an implicit or nonstatutory ground for vacating under the FAA.102
After a review of evidence from the manuscript of the arbitration proceedings, the Court
concluded: “Consequently, we conclude that based on the record presented for our review, it is
not manifest that the arbitrators acted contrary to the applicable law and that their award should
be upheld”.103
Sixth Circuit
The position of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is clearly set forth in
Dawahare v. Spencer:104An arbitration decision “must fly in the face of established legal
precedent” for the court to find manifest disregard of the law. An arbitration panel acts from
manifest disregard if “(1) the applicable legal principle is clearly defined and not subject to
reasonable debate; and (2) the arbitrators refuse to heed that legal principle.”105 Thus, to find
manifest disregard a court must find two things: the relevant law must be clearly defined and the
arbitrator must have consciously chosen not to apply it.”106
Seventh Circuit
After reviewing the decisions of other circuits, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit in Watts v. Tiffany107 stated: “The law in other circuits is similarly confused, doubtless
because the Supreme Court has been opaque. The dictum in Wilko and First Options was
unexplained and un-illuminated by any concrete application”.108 The court went on to state its

102

Id. at 760.
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210 F.3d 666, 669 (6th Cir. 2000).
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Id., see also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Jaros, 70 F. 3d. 418 (6th Cir. 1995).
106
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position in regard to manifest disregard of the law, which is substantially different from the
positions of other circuits:
There is, however, a way to understand “manifest disregard of the law” that preserves the
established relation between court and arbitrator and resolves the tension in the
competing lines of cases. It is this: an arbitrator may not direct the parties to violate the
law. In the main, an arbitrator acts as the parties’ agent and as their delegate may do
anything the parties may do directly.109
In a concurring opinion, Judge Williams agreed with the final decision of her two colleagues in
that the district court had properly enforced the arbitration award. However, she was critical of
the majority’s reasoning Court and its pronouncement of what appeared to be a new, or at least
different, definition of manifest disregard:
Because the majority has effectively rejected the manifest disregard doctrine, I will
briefly express my concern with that holding. It should be noted that the doctrine of
manifest disregard has been substantively uniform in federal courts, requiring that (1) the
arbitrator knew of a governing legal principle yet refused to apply it or ignore it
altogether, and (2) the law ignored by the arbitrator was well defined, explicit and clearly
applicable to the case. [citing cases] Every court of appeals, including our own, has held
that a court may review the decision of an arbitrator for “manifest disregard of the law,”
and has adopted, in substance, that very definition. Moreover, the words in the doctrine
itself are more in accord with such an interpretation. (Citations omitted.) The majority’s
holding conflicts with that precedent, and leaves the doctrine internally inconsistent and
effectively impotent.110
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Id. at 580, 581.
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Eight Circuit
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Homestake Mining Co. v. United
Steelworkers

111

considered an appeal from the decision of the district court, which overruled a

motion to vacate an arbitration award. One of the grounds for the motion was that the arbitrator’s
decision evidenced a manifest disregard for law. The Eighth Circuit’s opinion affirmed the
district court’s decision and reinstated the arbitral award: “The arbitrator’s interpretation of this
regulation in plain language is neither “completely irrational [nor] evidences a manifest disregard
for law,”112 and is therefore “insulated from review.”113
In Hoffman v. Cargill,114 the Eighth Circuit overruled a decision of the district court that had
vacated an arbitration award because of the panel’s manifest disregard of the law and because the
panel’s decision was irrational:
We have allowed that “beyond the grounds for vacation provided in the FAA, an award
will only be set aside where it is completely irrational or evidence of manifest disregard
of the law.” These extra-statutory standards are extremely narrow: An arbitration decision
may only be said to be irrational where it fails to draw its essence from the agreement,
and an arbitration decision only manifests disregard for the law where the arbitrators
clearly identified the applicable, governing law and then proceed to ignore it. We may not
set an award aside simply because we might have interpreted the agreement differently or
because the arbitrators erred in interpreting the law or in determining the facts.115
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Ninth Circuit
In Barnes v. Logan,116 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed its prior
holdings in setting forth their standards of review:
Judicial review of an arbitrator’s decision “is both limited and highly deferential.”117 An
award will not be set aside unless it manifests a complete disregard of the law.118 Thus,
an award must be confirmed if the arbitrators, even arguably, construed or applied the
contract and acted within the scope of their authority.119 We may affirm the judgment of
the District Court on any ground fairly supported by the record.120
In a subsequent case, Investors Equity Life Insurance Co. of Hawaii, Ltd. v. ADM Investor
Services, Inc.,121 the Ninth Circuit Court held:” Before the Court can conclude that arbitrators
acted in ‘manifest disregard’, it must be clear from the record that the arbitrators recognize the
applicable law and then ignored it.”122
Tenth Circuit
Kelley v. Michaels123 was an appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit from
the district court’s ruling that confirmed an arbitration award in a securities law arbitration. One
of the grounds for the appeal and for setting aside the award was that punitive damages were
awarded where the parties had agreed in a choice of law provision that any dispute would be
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governed by New York law, which prohibited the award of punitive damages.124 The uniform
submission agreement, however, provided for arbitration pursuant to National Association of
Securities Dealers Inc. (NASD), and the NASD arbitrators’ manual provided for a possible
award of punitive damages.125
An identical matter had come before the Supreme Court in Mastrobuono v. Shearson
Lehman.126 The Court in that case stated:
. . . [T]the FAA insures that parties’ agreements will be enforced according to their terms
even if a rule of state law would otherwise exclude such claims from arbitration. In
resolving this matter the Supreme Court noted: The best way to harmonize the choice of
law provision with the arbitration provisions is to read “the laws of the State of New
York” to encompass substantive principles that New York courts would apply, but not to
include special rules limiting the authority of arbitrators. Thus, the choice of law
provision covers the rights and duties of the parties, while the arbitration clause covers
arbitration; neither sentence intrudes upon the other. In contrast, the respondents’ read
sets up the two clauses in conflict with one another; one foreclosing punitive
damages, the other allowing them. This interpretation is untenable.127
The Tenth Circuit stated in Kelley v. Michaels, that based on the holding in the Mastrobuono
it was compelled to find that the arbitration panel did not exceed its authority in awarding the
Kelleys punitive damages.128 Mastrobuono and Kelley hold that where there are specific conflicts
between the arbitration clause and the choice of law provisions, full effect shall be given to the
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arbitration clause where it defines the limits of the authority of arbitrators, notwithstanding a
conflict with a choice of law provision.
Eleventh Circuit
In Brown v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp.,129 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
disposed of an appeal from the district court’s refusal to vacate the arbitrator’s award. The Court
held that the party alleging the manifest disregard of the law had failed to show that the arbitrator
in fact acted with such disregard. Arbitration awards will not be reversed due to an erroneous
interpretation of the law by the arbitrator:.130 “To manifest disregard the law, one must be
conscious of the law and deliberately ignore it.”131
District of Columbia Circuit
In Laprade v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc.,132, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit
considered an appeal from the district court’s decision that had rejected an argument that the
arbitration panel had acted in manifest disregard of the governing law:
Manifest disregard of the law “means more than error or misunderstanding with respect to the
law.”133 Consequently, “to modify or vacate an award on this ground, the Court must find (1)
that the arbitrator knew of a governing legal principle yet refused to apply it or ignored it
altogether and (2) the law ignored by the arbitrators was well defined, explicit, and clearly
applicable to the case.134
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D.

Elements of “manifest disregard of the law” standard
The case law makes clear that "a party seeking to vacate an arbitration award for ‘manifest

disregard’ of the law may not proceed by merely objecting to the results of the arbitration."135
All of the circuit courts have more or less found that "manifest disregard" of the law "clearly
means more than [an arbitral] error or misunderstanding with respect to the law."136 As a result
of the Supreme Court's failure to define manifest disregard of the law, the federal appellate
courts have taken up the role of fleshing out this standard. At first glance, the resulting cases
seem chaotic; however, at least one commentator has discerned a pattern among the decisions.137
Professor Stephen Hayford argues that almost all the appellate courts seem to have arrived at a
consensus that manifest disregard of the law consists of two separate elements.138 First, there is
an "actus reus" element of the offense.139 The arbitrator must make such a "blatant, gross
misapplication of law [to the facts such] that it is apparent on the face of the award."140 Second,
an arbitrator must be aware of the law in the relevant area but nonetheless consciously or
deliberately disregard the law where an ordinary, reasonable person could discern the applicable
legal standard.141 This is the "mens rea" element of the defense.142
Thus, even if a reviewing court finds a blatant misapplication of the relevant law (reflected in
an arbitral result it believes to conflict with that law), vacatur is warranted under the "manifest
disregard" of the law ground only if the court is able to conclude that the arbitrator knew,
correctly interpreted the relevant law, but nevertheless made a conscious, intentional decision to
135
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ignore it.143 Both aspects of the "mens rea" requirement must be satisfied—the arbitrator must
have been aware of the correct law and further must have consciously or intentionally chosen not
to apply it to the facts of the case in rendering the award.144
Despite this consensus, appellate courts have varied widely in their application of this twostep process, and have responded to these criteria in three general ways.145 These categories do
not represent three distinct groupings of the manifest disregard of law standard, but rather a
continuum of deference that the courts give to non-reasoned awards handed down by
arbitrators.146
1.

The "Futility Acknowledged" Approach to the "Manifest Disregard" of the Law
Analysis
In this approach, the reviewing courts, in the absence of reasoned awards which is often the

case in commercial arbitration, attempt to determine the criteria that the arbitrators utilize to
arrive at their decisions. In this endeavor, the courts often cannot determine if the arbitrators
willfully disregarded the law.147 The majority of circuit appeals opinions applying the "manifest
disregard" of the law standard follow this approach. Because this analytical tack never leads to
vacatur, it reduces the "manifest disregard" of the law ground to a nullity.148
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M & C Corp. v. Erwin Behr & Co., 87 F.3d 844, 851 (6th Cir. 1996) (observing that, on the facts of the case
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A reviewing court that requires direct evidence of arbitral knowledge of the correct
interpretation of the law (the "mens rea" element) will never vacate an award that does not set
forth the arbitrator's conclusions of law and fails to reveal the manner in which the arbitrator
applied that law to the facts of the controversy.149
2.

The "Big Error" Approach to the "Manifest Disregard" of the Law Analysis
The court, in this approach, focuses only on the ‘actus reus’ element.150 Under this view, the

key for the petitioner seeking vacatur is convincing a reviewing court that the controlling law is
so clear and well-settled as to warrant the inference that the arbitrator must have been aware of it.
So the strategy of the petitioners would be to convince the court that the law is so clear that the
arbitrator must necessarily have violated the law.151
Courts that follow this approach assumes that arbitrators have disregarded the law. The
second circuit in Willemijn Houdstermaatschappij, BV, v. Standard Microsystems Corp.

152

observed that, "a court may infer that the arbitrators manifestly disregarded the law if it finds that
the error [of law] made by the made by the arbitrators is obvious [as measured by whatever
degree of error standard the particular court has embraced]."153

Under the Standard

Microsystems formulation of the "manifest disregard" of the law test, vacatur can transpire if the
court perceives in the award what amounts to a gross error of law that offends its sense of
justice.154
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3.

The Presumption-Based Approach to the "Manifest Disregard" of the Law Analysis
The presumption-based approach gives the least amount of deference to the arbitrator's

findings of fact and interpretations of law, substituting instead the opinion of the court.155 The
Eleventh Circuit in Montes v. Shearson Lehman Brothers156 and the Second Circuit in Halligan
v. Piper Jaffray Inc. 157 followed this approach, but to date are the only two cases at the federal
appellate court level that have found that the arbitrators manifestly disregarded the law.158
In Halligan, an employee submitted evidence in an employment discrimination arbitration
claiming that his former employer fired him because he was too old.159 The panel denied
Halligan any relief and offered no explanation or rationale for the result.

160

The district court

judge found that
The record . . . [did] not indicate the Panel's awareness, prior to its determinations, of the
standards for burdens of proof . . . [and that] where [the panel] did not issue a written
opinion, [the district court could not] conclude that the panel did in fact disregard the
parties' burdens of proof" because it was not the district court's job to reconsider evidence
after the arbitral panel had already done so.161
The appellate court noted that the manifest disregard of the law defense, which Halligan
raised on appeal, consisted of two elements: "(1) the arbitrators knew of a governing legal
principle yet refused to apply it or ignored it altogether and that (2) the law ignored by the
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arbitrators was well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable to the case."162 In this case the court
in fact went ahead and evaluated the evidence that the tribunal had considered.163 The court
noted that the parties' counsel had explained the applicable standards of law to the panel (though
no evidence showed that the panel actually understood the law) and that Halligan presented
strong evidence in his favor.164 The court assumed that the panel understood the law and found
Halligan's strong evidence convincing: "[Combined with] the agreement of the parties that the
arbitrators were correctly advised of the applicable legal principles, we are inclined to hold that
they ignored the law or the evidence or both."

165

Additionally, the court determined that the

arbitrators must have acted in manifest disregard of the law because the panel did not issue a
written award.166
In Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros.,167 an employee appealed against the denial of her
petition to vacate an arbitrator's decision "denying her claim for over-time pay from her former
employer."168 Specifically, she claimed that her employer's lawyer urged the arbitration panel to
ignore the relevant law of the Fair Labor Standards Act and to find in favor of the employer.169
As in Halligan, the court in Montes engaged in a lengthy review of the facts used by the
arbitration tribunal and determined that manifest disregard of the law consists of two steps -- that
the arbitrator was "conscious of the law" but "deliberately ignored it."
went on to find the following:
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However, the court
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In the absence of any stated reasons for the decision and in light of the marginal evidence
presented to it, we cannot say that this [manifest disregard of the law] is not what the
panel did . . . as the arbitrators recognized that they were told to disregard the law (which
the record reflects they knew) in a case in which the evidence to support the award was
marginal. Thus, there is nothing in the record to refute the suggestion that the law was
disregarded. Nor does the record clearly support the award.171
The court concluded that, since the facts did not support the ruling and since there was no
presumption in favor of the arbitrator, the arbitrator must have disregarded the law at the urging
of the employer's counsel.172
Both of these cases illustrate the essential components of the presumption-based approach.173
This approach allows the court to work backwards, in that.174 To vacate an unsatisfactory award,
a court needs to conduct a review of the record, find satisfactory evidence that the arbitrator
knew the correct law, and assume as a result that he necessarily disregarded the law to arrive at
such an unjust result 175.
The court presumes and assumes too many issues in this approach and in fact, attempts to
conduct and independent review of the evidence, the facts and the law, and tries to match its
conclusions with that of the arbitral award.176 Hence, in the absence of written opinions for
awards, the court is often second guessing an arbitrators’ evaluation of the law or fact.177 In
essence, the courts almost frustrate the entire purpose and process of arbitration in commercial
matters since the courts end up spending the time that arbitration was designed to save;
171
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arbitrators should not have their findings of facts second guessed in the guise of judicial review
on the law.

E.

“Manifest Disregard of the law” - statutory provision for vacatur in Georgia
In 1988, the Georgia Legislature adopted the current Georgia Arbitration Code.178 This Code,

based largely on the UAA, replaced the previous common law arbitration procedures codified in
sections 9-9-1 through 9-9-11.179 Georgia courts have recognized the same fundamental goals of
arbitration as that of the UAA and the role it plays in the interaction between arbitration awards
and the judiciary.180 The Georgia Supreme Court has noted that arbitration provisions must be
strictly construed because they are in derogation of common law.181 The courts of Georgia have
long recognized that the Georgia Arbitration Code provides the exclusive grounds for vacating
an arbitration award.182 "The power of a court to vacate an arbitration award has been severely
limited in order not to frustrate the legislative purpose of avoiding litigation by resorting to
arbitration."183 Notably, no other state has adopted manifest disregard of the law as a statutory
ground for vacatur.184 In fact California and New Jersey have expressly rejected manifest
disregard of the law as a ground of vacatur.185
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Until recently, the Georgia Arbitration Code's section on vacatur did not differ significantly
from its federal counterpart.186 However, in the 2003 legislative session, the Georgia Assembly
passed a law to add the “manifest disregard of the law” standard as another defense to the
Georgia Arbitration Code's section on vacatur.187 The addition of the “manifest disregard of the
law” defense was proposed as a consumer protection measure.188
The amendment was enacted in response to the Georgia Supreme Court’s decision in
Progressive Data Systems, Inc. v. Jefferson Randolph Corp.,189 which reversed a Georgia Court
of Appeals’ decision that had vacated an arbitration award on the basis of what the Court of
Appeals found was a manifest disregard of the law.190 The case, however, was not a consumer
dispute but rather a contract dispute in which, after a two-day arbitration hearing, the arbitrator
ruled for Progressive Data and awarded compensatory damages of $81,540 plus attorney fees
and expenses.191 The Georgia Court of Appeals set aside the award holding that the arbitrator had
confused the applicable damages and thus the award amounted to a "manifest disregard of the
law."192 The Georgia Supreme Court, however, held that, "in as much as the Code does not list
'manifest disregard of the law' as a ground for vacating an arbitration award, it cannot be used as
an additional ground for vacatur."193 Judge Carley, writing for the dissent, noted that, while
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manifest disregard of the law was not on the list of enumerated defenses, "in the very rare
instance where an arbitrator intentionally ignores a controlling legal principle, he or she lacks the
requisite impartiality . . .” and that in such cases, the arbitrator necessarily oversteps the authority
vested upon him.194 The dissent also tried to qualify the manifest disregard of the law defense by
noting that it entailed more than just a misunderstanding or misinterpretation of the law.195
The principle of “manifest disregard of the law” was enacted as a statutory defense in
Georgia in 2003. The provisions of the amended statute are as follows:
§ 9-9-13. Vacation of award by court; application; grounds; rehearing; appeal of order:
(a) An application to vacate an award shall be made to the court within three months after
delivery of a copy of the award to the applicant.
(b) The award shall be vacated on the application of a party who either participated in the
arbitration or was served with a demand for arbitration if the court finds that the rights of
that party were prejudiced by:
(1) Corruption, fraud, or misconduct in procuring the award;
(2) Partiality of an arbitrator appointed as a neutral;
(3) An overstepping by the arbitrators of their authority or such imperfect execution of it
that a final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made;
(4) A failure to follow the procedure of this part, unless the party applying to vacate the
award continued with the arbitration with notice of this failure and without objection; or
(5) The arbitrator's manifest disregard of the law. 196
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Nonetheless, in a recent judgment decided in July 2007 in ABCO Builders, Inc. v.
Progressive Plumbing, Inc.,197 the Georgia Supreme Court emphatically stated that in the
absence of any evidence of a specific intent to disregard the appropriate law, an arbitration award
cannot be vacated under the manifest disregard of the law standard. 198 The court in Progressive
Plumbing argued, with regard to certain damages awarded to ABCO Builders, Inc. in a
construction contract dispute that the arbitration panel was presented with the proper legal
formula to calculate these damages, but it did not employ this formula.199 However, without
providing any concrete evidence of it, the court, went on to conclude in Progressive Plumbing
that this erroneous computation could not have been a mistake or misinterpretation, but, instead,
was an intentional disregard of the law.200
The Georgia Supreme Court cited to B.L. Harbert Intl. v. Hercules Steel Co., which held that
"even if we were convinced that we would have decided this contractual dispute differently, that
would not be nearly enough to set aside the award"201 and Health Services Mgmt. Corp. v.
Hughes, which stated that "There must be something beyond and different from mere error in
law or failure on the part of the arbitrators to understand or apply the law; it must be
demonstrated that the majority of arbitrators deliberately disregarded the law in order to reach
the result they did."202
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F.

Implications of the “Manifest Disregard of the Law” Standard in Georgia
Georgia's manifest disregard of the law defense is new and contains no statutory explanation

of the elements of the defense, leaving the courts to interpret the law.203 Hence the new law only
creates situations that could severely hamper the finality of arbitration awards and increase costs,
and provides little benefit to the system of commercial arbitration.204
Further, the FAA may preempt Georgia's Arbitration Code whenever an arbitration clause is
at issue in a contract that affects interstate commerce.205 This might lead to a collision between
principles of the Georgia Arbitration Code and the FAA. The Supreme Court of United States in
Southland noted that the FAA limited the enforceability of arbitration provisions to contracts
"evidencing a transaction involving commerce."206 Further the Supreme Court in Allied-Bruce
Terminix Cos. v. Dobson207 held that "involving commerce" was functionally equivalent to
“affecting commerce,” which in essence implies a very wide meaning to “interstate
commerce”.208 Hence, to the extent that statutory recognition of manifest disregard of the law
exists in Georgia as a barrier to enforcement of arbitration awards that are otherwise enforceable
under federal law, the FAA would preempt Georgia law and nullify the manifest disregard
defense when the contract in question affects interstate commerce because the defense is
inconsistent with the broad scope and public policy that FAA envisioned.209
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In Georgia, the legislature enacted the doctrine to provide protection to consumers from what
it perceived to be unfair arbitration practices.210 However, the manifest disregard of the law
doctrine offers little in the way of consumer protection and instead would hamper commercial
enterprise, a major beneficiary of arbitration in Georgia.211
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CHAPTER IV – Review of Arbitral Awards in India – Statutory Provisions

A.

International Commercial Arbitration in India – Finality and Enforcement

India has always held a deep-rooted commitment to the philosophy of arbitration in general.
Mahatma Gandhi, in 1927 wrote, “Differences we shall always have but we must settle them all,
whether religious or other, by arbitration.”212 Foreign arbitral awards have always been treated as
final on merits in India for the purposes of enforcement with limited or no scope for judicial
review except strictly under the statute. 213 India became a party to the New York Convention
with effect from October 11, 1960.214 In order to implement its obligations under this
Convention, India enacted the Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act, 1961.215 The
1961 Act has since been repealed and replaced by the new Indian Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996.216 The focus of the 1996 Act is the minimization of court intervention in the process
and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.217
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B.

Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
The Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, is a unification statute in the sense that it

was intended to give effect to multiple international commitments undertaken by India, namely
the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 1985, the New York
Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958, the Geneva
Convention on Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1927 and the Geneva Protocol on
Arbitration Clauses, 1923.218
The Act seeks not only to consolidate, but also to unify Indian law both on domestic and
international arbitration. In other words, under the Act, Indian law would be same for both
domestic and international arbitrations that take place within the Indian territory219. The 1996
Act is divided into four parts: Part I is concerned with domestic arbitrations; Part II deals with
the enforcement of New York Convention awards and European Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration (“Geneva Convention”) awards; Part III makes legislative provisions for
conciliation based on the 1980 UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules220; and finally, Part IV adds
supplementary provisions.221 Chapters one and two of Part II deal with the enforcement of the
New York and Geneva Conventions awards respectively.222 A foreign award in India is
enforceable either under the New York Convention,223 the Geneva Convention or under common
law as applicable in India.224
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Before the 1996 Act, the Indian Arbitration Act 1940 (which was repealed by the 1996 Act)
did not make any reference to international arbitrations taking place in Indian territory.225 Since
the 1940 Act was to be applied to all arbitrations taking place within Indian territory,
international arbitrations were also ipso facto covered by the enactment.226 The new enactment,
however, makes a special reference to international commercial arbitrations and has defined the
same under Section 2(f) of the 1996 Act.
C.

Recourse against Arbitral Awards
Section 34 under Part I of the 1996 Act lays down the provisions under which applications

could be filed to set aside arbitral awards. Section 48, Part II of the 1996 Act provides the
conditions for enforcement of foreign awards. Section 34 and 48 of the 1996 Act essentially
mirror each other in terms of their provisions, although an application challenging an arbitral
award is filed under section 34 of the Act.
In relation to the enforcement of foreign awards, the Indian Supreme Court in Fuerst Day
Lawson Ltd. v. Jindal Exports Ltd.,227 held that there is no need for separate proceedings in order
to enable the court to decide the enforceability of an award or to make it binding as a order or
decree and to execute the award. The Supreme Court made the following observations:
Part II of the Act relates to enforcement of certain foreign awards. Chapter I of this Part
deals with New York Conventions Awards. Section 46 of the Act speaks as to when a
foreign award is binding. Section 47 states what evidence the party applying for the
enforcement of a foreign award should produce before the Court. Section 48 states
the conditions for enforcement of foreign awards. According to Section 49, if the Court is
conscience; if the rule is inequitable or has been abrogated or modified by statute in England, it will not be
applicable in India; see Mukul Dutta v. Indian Airlines Corp., A.I.R.1962 311(Calcutta H.C.) 319.
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satisfied that a foreign award is enforceable under this Chapter, the award shall be
deemed to be a decree of that Court and that Court has to proceed further to execute the
foreign award as a decree of that Court.
Specifically, a court hearing an application to set aside an award under the 1996 Act is, on the
face of the wording of the 1996 Act, precluded from reviewing--even indirectly--the merits of
the award since setting-aside is no longer possible for errors of law or fact.228
Section 34 of the 1996 reads as follows:
Application for setting aside arbitral award. –
(1) Recourse to a court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for
setting aside such award in accordance with sub-section (2) and subsection (3).
(2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the court only if(a) The party making the application furnishes proof that(i) A party was under some incapacity, or
(ii) The arbitration agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have
subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law for the time being in force; or
(iii) The party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of
an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or
(iv) The arbitral award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the
terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the
scope of the submission to arbitration:
Provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from
those not so submitted, only that part of the arbitral award which contains decisions on
matters not submitted to arbitration may be set aside; or
228
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(v) The composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in
accordance with the agreement of the parties, unless such agreement was in conflict with
a provision of this Part from which the parties cannot derogate, or, failing such
agreement, was not in accordance with this Part; or
(b) The court finds that(i) The subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the
law for the time being in force, or
(ii) The arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of India.
Explanation. -Without prejudice to the generality of sub-clause (ii), it is hereby declared,
for the avoidance of any doubt, that an award is in conflict with the public policy of India
if the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption or was in
violation of section 75 or section 81.229

D.

Meaning and scope of “Public Policy” according to the 1996 Act
The explanatory notes which follow Sections 34(2)(b)(ii) and 48(2)(b) of the 1996 Act make

clear that a party seeking to set aside or resist recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award
on grounds of public policy faces a very high threshold.230 Essentially, in order to be contrary to
the public policy of India, the award must rise to the level of having been induced by fraud or
corruption.231 Furthermore, the explanation to Section 34(2)(b)(ii) also specifies that a violation
of public policy arises where there is a breach of the confidentiality provisions contained in
Section 75 of the 1996 Act, or where evidence obtained in conciliation proceedings has been
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adduced in the arbitration.232 In short, pursuant to the examples specified in the explanatory notes
included in the 1996 Act, only a serious violation of due process will amount to a violation of
Indian public policy.
Thus, the explanatory notes provided in the 1996 Act are clearly in line with the
interpretation given to the corresponding provisions in the UNCITRAL Model Law.233 Indeed,
according to the UNCITRAL Model Law Commission Report, the term "public policy"
comprises: [F]undamental notions and principles of justice. . . . It was understood that the term
'public policy,' which was used in the 1958 New York Convention and many other treaties,
covered fundamental principles of law and justice in substantive as well as procedural respects.
Thus, instances such as corruption, bribery or fraud and similar serious cases would constitute a
ground for setting aside.234
Based on the foregoing, the public policy standard set by the 1996 Act is--consistent with the
intention underlying the corresponding UNCITRAL Model Law provision--intended to be
high.235 Accordingly, the 1996 Act provides that only where an award is based on a serious
violation of due process can the public policy ground be successfully invoked to set aside or
resist enforcement of such an award.
As regards the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, the Indian Act
embodies the New York Convention. However one of the main problems that arose in the
application of the New York Convention was the interpretation of the meaning and scope of
“public policy” by the National Courts. Indian courts tended to equate the term “public policy”
with the term “law” as they were conditioned by section 13(f) of the Code of Civil Procedure of
232
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India 1908, which provided that a foreign judgment may be refused recognition and enforcement
in India if it sustains a claim founded on a breach of any law in force in India.236 The
repercussions of such an approach are self-evident any foreign arbitral award that is not in
conformance with the provisions of any of the laws in India could be struck down by adopting
this view.237 This would mean that hardly any foreign arbitral award could be enforced in
India.238
1.

Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Company
Fortunately, the Supreme Court of India in Renusagar239 dispelled many of the doubts with

regard to the scope of “public policy” and clarified the meaning of “public policy” when used in
enforcement of foreign awards. The Court said the terms should not be equated with the law of
India: “Something more than the violation of the law of India must be established.” By applying
this criterion, the enforcement of foreign awards would be refused, if such enforcement would be
contrary to:
(i) the fundamental policy of Indian law; or
(ii) the interests of India; or
(iii)justice or morality240.
This decision set an extremely high standard for Indian courts to refuse to enforce a foreign
arbitral award.
The Supreme Court of India has recognized that international arbitral awards are enforceable
internationally, and therefore should be international in their validity and effect.241 The Supreme
236
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Court, in Renusagar,242 recognized the pro-enforcement bias of the New York Convention, and
thus held that a court in India should restrict itself to the grounds outlined in Section 48 of the
Act. Those grounds, moreover, do not enablea party to challenge an arbitral award on its
merits.243 The Supreme Court also endorsed the view that foreign awards must be more liberally
enforced.244 The Court held that mere violation of a law would not lead to the conclusion that
“public policy” has been infringed.245
The High Court of Delhi recognized in Ludwig Wunsche & Co. v. Raunaq International
Ltd.246 that under Section 7 of the Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act, 1961
(the implementation legislation of the 1958 New York Convention), the “Court has no power to
set aside the award, the Court can only refuse enforcement of the award.”247 The provisions of
the New York Convention have greatly influenced the UNCITRAL Model law, and since the
1996 Act has adopted the Model law, there is no reason why Indian courts will not apply this
reasoning to awards under the new Act.248
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CHAPTER V - Review of Arbitral Awards in India – Scope Broadened

A.

Scope of Judicial Intervention Broadened
The efficacy of any legislation must be judged by its implementation rather than its

intentions.249 Unfortunately, in practice, the Indian courts have vastly enlarged the scope of
challenge of awards to much more than what is available under the 1996 Act.
1.

Oil & Natural Gas Corp. Ltd. v. SAW Pipes Ltd.

In this case, the Supreme Court of India adopted a broad interpretation of the term “public
policy” by essentially including “error of law” as a new ground for setting aside an arbitral
award. 250 This “error of law” ground was not provided for under the 1996 Act. The Court then
effectively used this new ground as a basis to review the merits of the case. While the Saw Pipes
decision is, at first glance, only relevant to proceedings to set aside awards with seat of
arbitration in India, the ramifications of this decision may potentially extend to recognition and
enforcement proceedings of foreign awards in India.251
The Supreme Court of India's decision in the SAW Pipes case concerned an arbitral award
rendered in a dispute between two domestic parties in India. SAW Pipes Ltd. ("SAW Pipes"),
the respondent in the case before the Supreme Court, had agreed to supply Oil and Natural Gas
Corp. Ltd. ("ONGC"), the appellant, with casing pipes for offshore oil exploration.252 The
contract between SAW Pipes and ONGC provided that a delay to the contractually agreed date
249
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for the supply of the pipes would entitle ONGC to a stipulated amount as liquidated damages.253
SAW Pipes delivered the pipes late, claiming force majeure based on strikes, and sought a time
extension.254 ONGC denied this request and claimed liquidated damages for the late delivery of
the pipes.255 SAW Pipes disputed this application of liquidated damages and the matter was
referred to the Arbitral Tribunal.
In its award, the Arbitral Tribunal held that although the strikes did not fall within the
contractual definition of force majeure, ONGC was not entitled to liquidated damages for the
delay since it had failed to establish that it had suffered any loss as a result of the late delivery.256
Accordingly, the Arbitral Tribunal held that ONGC had wrongfully applied for liquidated
damages.257 ONGC sought to set aside the arbitral award before the Indian courts on grounds of
public policy pursuant to section 34(2)(b)(ii) of the 1996 Act.
The Supreme Court set aside the award on the basis that the Arbitral Tribunal had erred when
it concluded that ONGC must prove the loss it suffered in order to seek liquidated damages.258 It
held that, as a matter of contractual interpretation and statutory law, the appellant was not
required to prove its loss and, therefore, was entitled to liquidated damages.259

B.

New standard – “Patent Illegality”
The Supreme Court of India has also introduced a new ground for setting aside an award

called “patent illegality”. The basis for the same has been explained as follows: "In our view,
reading section 34 conjointly with other provisions of the 1996 Act, it appears that the legislative
253
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intent could not be that if the award is in contravention of the provisions of the 1996 Act, still
however, it couldn't be set aside by the Court."260
The Court then analyzed whether the award could be set-aside on public policy grounds. The
Court regarded the standard of public policy laid down in Renusagar261 as "narrow" meaning of
public policy and held in Saw Pipes as follows:
. . . [I]in a case where the judgment . . . is challenged before the . . . court exercising
revisional jurisdiction, the jurisdiction of such court would be wider. Therefore, in a case
where the validity of award is challenged, there is no necessity of giving a narrower
meaning to the term 'public policy of India.' On the contrary, wider meaning is required
to be given so that the 'patently illegal award' passed by the Arbitral Tribunal could be
set aside.262
Thus, the Supreme Court lowered the threshold of the public policy ground for setting-aside
arbitral awards. It ruled that, certainly in cases of set-aside proceedings in India, an award can be
set aside on public policy grounds, not only if the award is contrary to one of the three public
policy grounds enumerated in Renusagar, but also if it is "patently illegal."263
The question that therefore arises is: What exactly did the Court mean when it stated that an
award would also be contrary to public policy if it were “patently illegal”? Close scrutiny of the
SAW Pipes Decision shows that the Indian Supreme Court employed a substantially different
meaning of the term "patent illegality" than had been generally accepted and used in the public
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policy case law developed in international arbitration.264First, the Court stated that there is no
definition of "public policy" for the purposes of Section 34(2)(b)(ii) of the 1996 Act:
The phrase 'Public Policy of India' is not defined under the 1996 Act. Hence, the said
term is required to be given meaning in context and also considering the purpose of the
section and scheme of the 1996 Act. . . . Hence, the concept 'public policy' is considered
to be vague, susceptible to narrow or wider meaning depending upon the context in
which it is used.265
Second, since the Court concluded that there was no definition of public policy at hand, it
decided that--in apparent disregard of the high threshold for public policy provided for in the
explanatory note to Section 34(2)(b)(ii)--it would adopt a broader meaning of "public policy."266
Finally, the Court set forth its definition of "patent illegality." It held that an award was
"patently illegal" if the Arbitral Tribunal had committed an error of law.267 By interpreting the
concept of "public policy" to include "error of law," the Supreme Court went beyond the scope
of the 1996 Act.268 Indeed, the 1996 Act did not mention error of law as a ground for setting
aside an award based on public policy.
In short, the Supreme Court effectively used the public policy ground as means to conduct a
review of the merits of the case and to "substitute its own view for the view taken by the
Arbitrators. . ."269 The Court's interpretation of public policy is so broad that it potentially opens
the floodgates to more and more challenges of arbitral awards before the Indian courts.270
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C.

Enforcement Proceedings of Foreign Awards.
While the Saw Pipes Decision was rendered in the context of an Indian award, and therefore

arguably does not apply to the recognition and enforcement proceedings for foreign awards
pursuant to Section 48 of the 1996 Act, the Court did not specifically exclude foreign awards
from its reasoning.271 Since the provisions on public policy with regard to the setting aside and
the recognition and enforcement of awards in Sections 48(2)(b) and 34(2)(b)(ii) essentially
mirror each other, it is uncertain whether the Court will in the future apply its broad
interpretation of public policy to the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, i.e., awards rendered
outside India.
This uncertainty is further compounded by the Supreme Court's decision of 2001 in Bhatia
International v. Bulk Trading SA & Another.272 In this case, the Court ruled that Part I of the
1996 Act, which includes Section 34 on set-aside proceedings, would also apply to foreign
awards unless impliedly or expressly excluded by the parties. Specifically, the Court stated:
To conclude we hold that the provisions of part I would apply to all arbitrations and to all
proceedings relating thereto. Where such arbitration is held in India, the provisions of
part I would compulsory [sic] apply. . . . In cases of international commercial arbitrations
held out of India, provisions of part I would apply unless the parties by agreement,
express or implied, exclude all or any of its provisions. In that case, the laws or rules
chosen by the parties would prevail. Any provision, in part I, which is contrary to or
excluded by that law or rules will not apply.273
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The Bhatia decision has been the subject of much debate as it reversed the established
understanding that Part I of the 1996 Act would not apply to arbitrations with a seat outside of
India.274 Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that in the future, an ill-considered decision could
construe the reasoning in the Saw Pipes case--which, of course, arose in the context of a set-aside
proceeding under Part I--to also somehow apply to recognition and enforcement proceedings
under Section 48 contained in Part II of the 1996 Act.

D.

Judicial Intervention on the grounds of error of fact or law

The 1996 Act was brought into existence mainly to achieve, among other objectives, the
minimization of the supervisory role of courts in the arbitral process and to provide that every
final arbitral award is enforced in the same manner as if it were a decree of the court.275
Courts in India have given varied opinions from time to time as regards judicial intervention
and review of arbitral awards. The courts have held that, “as the parties choose their own
arbitrator, they cannot, when the award is good on the face of it, object to the decision either on
law or on facts and the award will neither be remitted nor set aside.’”276 The mere fact that the
arbitrators have erred in law or facts can be no ground for interference by the court and the award
will be binding on the parties.277
However, courts have not been always consistent in their views with regard to reviewing of
arbitral awards. The Supreme Court, in one case, observed, “when an arbitrator instead of giving
effect to the statutory formula contained in the contract, coined one of his own which he thought
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was just and reasonable, the arbitrator committed jurisdictional error and the award could not be
sustained.”278
The court should not substitute its own reasons for that of the arbitrator as long as the
arbitrator’s reasons do not suffer from an error apparent on the face of the record or that is
otherwise unreasonable and based on surmises and conjectures.279 In Maharashtra State
Electricity Board v. Sterlite Industries (India),280 the Supreme Court stated that, “An error in law
on the face of the award means, that you can find in the award or document actually incorporated
thereto, as for instance, a note appended by the arbitrator stating the reasons for his judgment,
some legal propositions which is the basis of the award and which you can then say is
erroneous.”281
On the issue of error of law and error of fact patent on the face of the award, which may be
grounds to set aside an award, the Supreme Court in the Saw Pipes282 case, relied upon .Arosan
Enterprises Limited v. Union of India.283 There, the Court stated,
Where the error of finding of fact having a bearing on the award is patent and is easily
demonstrable without the necessity of carefully weighing the various possible view
points, the interference in the award based on erroneous finding of fact is permissible and
similarly, if an award is based by applying a principle of law which is patently erroneous,
and but for such erroneous application of legal principle, the award could not have been
made, such award is liable to be set aside by holding that there has been a legal
misconduct on the part of the arbitrator.284
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In a recent decision in Hindustan Zinc Ltd. v Friends Coal Carbonization,285 the Supreme
Court again set aside the portion of the arbitral award, which was opposed to the specific terms
of the contract. The Court, relying on Saw Pipes, observed that it is open to the court to consider
whether the award is against the specific terms of contract and if so, whether to interfere with it
on the ground that it is patently illegal and opposed to the public policy of India.286 However, the
proper approach of the courts in matters relating to setting aside of arbitral awards is limited and
is expressly stated in the 1996 Act.287

E.

Standard of Review entailed by the principle of “Competence-Competence”
A strict interpretation of “Competence-Competence” would dictate that courts limit

themselves to establishing the prima facie existence of an arbitration agreement, and the arbitral
tribunals be left to substantively rule their own jurisdiction.288 Though this principle does not
deal with the finality and enforcement of arbitral awards, it certainly involves the issue of court
intervention and judicial review in the arbitral process. Besides, there is a counterargument that,
rather than courts intervening with the awards when they are later challenged for lack of
jurisdiction, parties are better off if courts definitively ruled on the existence and validity of the
arbitration agreements at the outset.289 The recent Indian Supreme Court decisions on this
principle raise more questions than they answer, but do at least give cause for optimism that in
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grappling with the standard of review entailed by Competence-Competence, Indian courts are
inching towards a less interventionist, pro-arbitration stance.290
In Shin-etsu Chemicals Co. v. Aksh Optifibre Ltd.,291 the question before the Indian Supreme
Court was whether Section 45 of the 1996 Act,292 which incorporated Article II(3) of the New
York Convention,293 required a prima facie or a final review by the national courts when faced
with a challenge to the validity and existence of an arbitration agreement.294 The Supreme Court
held by a 2-1 majority that, when considering a challenge to the existence or validity of an
arbitration agreement, "the court is required to take only a prima facie view for making the
reference to arbitration, leaving the parties to a full trial either before the Arbitral Tribunal or
before the court at the post-award stage."295 Shin-etsu was hailed as a progressive and proarbitration judgment.296
Less than three months after Shin-etsu, the Supreme Court in SBP & Co. v. Patel
Engineering297 permitted further court intervention in the arbitral process. The case concerned
the appointment of an arbitrator by the chief justice of the Supreme Court in circumstances
where the parties’ chosen method for constituting the tribunal had failed.298 The issue was
290
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referred to a seven-judge bench of the Supreme Court for a definitive ruling, and the court by a
majority of 6-1 held that the Chief Justice, while discharging this function, is entitled to
adjudicate on contentious preliminary issues such as the existence of a valid arbitration
agreement.299 It rejected the argument that the chief justice’s role be limited to a prima facie
review of the facts while making such a determination and instead held that the chief justice was
entitled to call for evidence to resolve jurisdictional issues.300
Significantly, the Supreme Court ruled that the Chief Justice’s findings on these preliminary
issues would be final and binding on the arbitral tribunal.301 This makes a mockery of the wellestablished principle of Competence-Competence—the power of an arbitral tribunal to determine
its own jurisdiction—as enshrined in section 16 of the 1996 Act. It also encourages parties to
sabotage the appointment process of arbitrators, to make spurious arguments about preliminary
issues, and to use evidentiary hearings in courts to delay arbitral proceedings.302
Almost fifteen months after Patel Engineering, the Supreme Court was again faced with the
issue of whether a dispute existed between the parties that must to be referred to arbitration in
Agri Gold Exims Ltd. v. Sri Lakshmi Knits and Wovens. 303 Although the Court did not discuss
Shin-etsu or Patel Engineering, the limited standards of review, which it applied in determining
the arbitrability of a dispute, made it significant for the purposes of Competence-Competence.
The Supreme Court held that where there an arbitration agreement exists, an Indian court is
obligated under Section 8 of the 1996 Act304 to refer the parties to arbitration.305 The Court's
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approach in Agri Gold is consistent with Shin-etsu in championing a pro-arbitration attitude
involving minimal interference by courts in the arbitral process. Agri Gold is a step in the right
direction as it shows an inclination on the part of Indian courts to respect arbitration clauses and
hold parties to their bargain by referring them to arbitration.
On their face, the legislative provisions regarding the set-aside and recognition and
enforcement of awards contained in the 1996 Act are promising and are in line with international
standards.306 However, decisions such as Saw Pipes and SBP Patel are changing the standard of
review to be applied by the Courts, which seriously calls into question the independence of
arbitral awards from judicial review on the merits.307
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CHAPTER VI - Standards of Judicial Review in the United States and India –
Observations

Both India and the United States are common law countries and signatories to the New York
Convention. As to the potential for a review of an award on merits by the Indian judiciary, it has
to stated that though India has not effectively recognized many non-statutory standards for
reviewing arbitral awards, Indian courts have been inconsistent in their approach in setting-aside
of the arbitral awards under the 1996 Act. This is a cause for concern since it is precisely this
independence from the courts which is imperative for achieving some of the key goals of
arbitration, namely speed and efficiency.308
The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Bill, 2003, was introduced before the Indian
Parliament in December 2003 and it aims to add a Section allowing an award to be set-aside
“where there is an error apparent on the face of the arbitration award giving rise to a substantial
question of law”.309 This bill is envisioned to apply to domestic awards.310 The Parliament is now
effectively trying to provide an additional ground of challenge under Clause 27 of the
Amendment Bill to provide that where the award is not an international award in India, the
parties can challenge it award on the additional ground that there is an error apparent on the face
of the award that gives rise to a substantial question of law.311In terms of the uncertainty caused
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by the Supreme Court's introduction of error of law as a new ground for setting aside an award,
as mentioned above, the December 2003 bill specifically sets forth "error of law" as a ground for
setting aside a domestic award.312 This bill is currently before the Parliament of India.313 While
it may--if passed--put to rest this uncertainty, it will potentially open the door wide for the courts
to revisit otherwise final arbitral awards on the merits.314
In the United States, the Second Circuit court in Toys “R” Us found that a non-domestic
award made in the United States would be subject to vacatur ‘in accordance with its domestic
arbitration law and its full panoply of express and implied grounds for relief’ including “manifest
disregard of the law”.315 The United States remains a victim of a self-inflicted competitive
disadvantage imposed by its single legal framework for arbitration.316 The adaptation of
“manifest disregard of the law” as a standard of review under the Georgia law in its statute has
only further expanded the general trend of court intervention in review of arbitral awards often
involving second guessing the interpretations of the arbitrators in their awards. The spillover of
domestic precedents into international cases will inevitably chill the selection of U.S cities for
arbitration, as foreign parties understandably hope to avoid excessive judicial interference.317
The never-ending debate over ‘manifest disregard of the law’, as well as the constant evolution
of judicially crafted grounds for setting aside arbitration awards, indicate that the time has
probably come to reform the FAA.318 The FAA should be amended to provide a separate
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framework for international arbitration that would restrict default rules limiting judicial review of
awards to only the narrowest grounds.319
The Eleventh Circuit, in an attempt to quell an appeal of arbitration brought under the
”manifest disregard of law” in B.L. Harbert International v. Hercules Steel Co., warned counsel
that they would be sanctioned for frivolous challenges to arbitration awards.320 The court stated:
This Court is exasperated by those who attempt to salvage arbitration losses through
litigation that has no sound basis in the law applicable to arbitration awards. The warning this
opinion provides is that in order to further the purposes of the FAA and to protect arbitration as a
remedy we are ready, willing, and able to consider imposing sanctions in appropriate cases.321
Some legal scholars even suggest that arbitral institutions should create a mechanism for
appeal so as to avoid judicial intervention and excessive review by the courts.322 As Professor
Thomas Klitgaard remarked, speed and finality are virtues, but only if you win. They are not
virtues if a fundamental mistake has been made.323
However, on a more optimistic note, at the end of the day, the United States non-statutory
“manifest disregard of the law” test establishes an extremely high hurdle for those seeking to
apply it to avoid liability for an arbitration award.324 It is difficult to imagine an international
arbitrator writing an award in which he or she painstakingly sets out an applicable legal principle
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and then defiantly ignores it or states that he or she will not apply it. It is hard to argue that such
an arbitrator would not deserve to see the award set aside or not enforced.

Conclusion
Judicial review of the merits of arbitral awards by national courts whether in the United
States or India, clearly runs the risk of impinging upon arbitration as an effective method of
dispute resolution. The trend has been such that the, parties to an arbitration agreement can no
longer be confident that an arbitral award, once rendered, is final.325 If disputes are anyway
going to end up in courts, there is very less incentive for parties to arbitrate in the first instance.
In sum, it is clear that judicial standards of review, like judicial precedents, are not the
property of private litigants.

326

That said, federal appellate courts must continue to develop

predictable precedents involving statutory grounds for judicial review.327 They also should take a
more uniform approach to the manifest disregard doctrine.328 When they do so, parties and their
counsel may be able to recognize the likelihood of success on appeal of most arbitration
awards.329Arbitration's goals are unquestionably best served by ensuring the finality of
arbitration awards.330 This is consistent with the bargain the parties have made, and the remedy
for any flaws in the system of arbitration should be for having the parties to choose better
arbitrators, not to appeal arbitration awards.331However on a positive note, at least one
commentator has argued that the frequency of judicial review of awards has not sapped
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arbitration of its efficiency.332 The system works despite pervasive motions and appeals because
non-reviewability is relatively inconsequential to arbitration's efficiency.333
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